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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS FOR 2010-THE JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

BY

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Expeditionary Operations for 2010 The Joint Expeditionary Force

bу

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ABSTRACT

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This paper proposes a force assignment evolution which would assign a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) to each regional unified command. This would allow for the unified commander-in-chief to have COCOM over the initial crisis response forces on a daily basis. The JEF would have an Army, Navy, Marine Corp, and Air Force component, which would routinely train and employ together. The paper considers the expeditionary history of the individual services, joint task forces, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force as a means of developing the JEF concept.

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EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS for 2010 -

THE JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

All of today's U.S. Armed Services are, or have portions that are, or are evolving into expeditionary forces. These forces are expeditionary in order to meet today's requirements and to meet the demands of future scenarios.

Current doctrine places these individual service expeditionary forces under a Joint Task Force (JTF) or Joint Force Commander (JFC) command and control structure for joint employment. This structure is adequate in most cases but has some shortfalls. Frequently the individual service components of the JTF or the JFC have never trained together and are unfamiliar with each other's capabilities. This takes time to develop and the initial phase of combat operations is not the best time to develop a working relationship that could have been developed in peacetime. Also a given unified regional commander-in-chief (CINC) takes the forces provided by the joint force provider, United States Atlantic Command (USACOM), without having any appreciation for their capability or being familiar with their leadership.

In order to enhance expeditionary operations, I propose the creation of a joint expeditionary force (JEF) under the combatant command (COCOM) of each regional unified CINC. These forces would be assigned to the CINC on a day-to-day basis for training and employment. This JEF essentially provides each CINC with a

standing JTF consisting of expeditionary forces from each service component which provide the CINC with his own immediate crisis response force.

While the United States is the sole remaining global superpower it is at the same time an island nation. In order to maintain this status, she must be able to defend U.S. vital, important, peripheral, and humanitarian interests anywhere on the globe. Today's military is not as forward based as it was during the Cold War which creates the need for expeditionary operations from the continental United States (CONUS) to forward locations in order to defend U.S. interests.

A key outcome of the end of the Cold War is the reduction in U.S. bases overseas which provided a forward based crisis response force for operations short of war. Today these crisis response operations are being conducted by a small expeditionary force and occur more frequently than during the Cold War. To illustrate the draw down in forward basing, consider that the U.S. Air Force has experienced a thirty-three percent decrease in personnel but a four hundred percent increase in overseas deployed operations since 1989. The Army is three times as busy as during the Cold War but has only two-thirds the troops. The other services have similar statistics. This increase in overseas operations comes partly as a result of the closing of overseas bases but more importantly is due to globalization. "Globalization means that more and more we as a nation are

affected by events beyond our borders."³ Consequently, the U.S. must maintain forces at appropriate readiness levels capable of deploying and performing their mission where needed.⁴

All of the U.S. armed services are or have been expeditionary at some time in the twentieth century. To explore the concept of and establish the need for a JEF this paper reviews the history of each service's expeditionary nature. This will demonstrate the existing expeditionary capabilities of each service and lead to the development of a joint expeditionary force for each regional unified command as a means of fulfilling the National Security Strategy for the twenty-first century.

Due to globalization, the downsizing of the U.S. military, and the wide range of threats to national security, the United States Military must create a JEF within each unified command to effectively support the National Security Strategy. Individual forces from each service component, capable of expeditionary operations will train together, operate under the combatant command (COCOM) of a unified commander, and employ as one synergistic joint expeditionary force to meet the taskings of tomorrow's regional unified commanders.

DEFINITIONS - PERSPECTIVES

To set the stage for this discussion we must first establish a common definition of expeditionary operations followed by a brief synopsis of the history of United States expeditionary force employment from World War I to 1999. Webster's dictionary

defines expeditionary as: "of, relating to, or constituting an expedition; sent on military service abroad." The Joint Dictionary defines an expedition as "a military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country and an expeditionary force as "an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country." Looking at these definitions one can see "the defining characteristic of expeditionary operations is the projection of force into a foreign setting." Adding joint to this simply means this expeditionary force is comprised of two or more services of the U.S. military.

Further clarification is necessary to fully describe those operations that constitute expeditionary operations. All expeditionary operations involve power projection but not all power projection operations are expeditionary. For example, a show of force operation involving airpower alone that returned to its home base would demonstrate power projection but not be expeditionary. To be expeditionary, forces must actually deploy.

Expeditionary forces need not always be offensive. The defensive forces which deployed for Operation DESERT SHIELD, were defensive in nature and at the same time expeditionary. Description forces deployed for humanitarian operations such as Operations PROVIDE COMFORT in Northern Iraq or RESTORE HOPE in Somalia were expeditionary forces. Expeditionary operations are also of

temporary duration and generally under austere conditions. ¹² For instance, U.S. forces assigned to Korea, Japan, and Germany, are not considered expeditionary since while these are forces in foreign lands, these are relatively permanent operations.

Expeditionary operations are part of the evolution from the Cold War era. The return of troops from overseas bases has on the one hand provided a pool of forces to create expeditionary forces and at the same time has limited our forward permanent presence thereby creating the need for expeditionary forces.

Expeditionary operations require a special mindset, one that the U.S. is still developing following the Cold War paradigm. The U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines have always been expeditionary but in this New World Order it is becoming their primary role.

In summary, joint expeditionary forces are the forces of two or more departments of the United States Armed Services, which are deployed on a mission in a foreign country for a specific objective. A unique mindset is a vital ingredient in expeditionary operations—"one that is constantly prepared for immediate deployment overseas into austere operating environments, bringing everything necessary to accomplish the mission."¹⁴

The size of the expeditionary force may range from the American Expeditionary Force of World War I which included 42 infantry divisions to the special purpose Marine Air Ground Task

Force (MAGTF) conducting a non combatant evacuation (NEO) of a U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1991. 15

HISTORY OF EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

The United States has been involved in expeditionary operations dating as far back as 1846 when troops traveled to Mexico for the Mexican war.

During World War I the forces sent to France to fight were referred to as the American Expeditionary Force or A.E.F. which fits the dictionary definition of a military force sent to conduct operations in a foreign country. Today many would not think of the A.E.F. as expeditionary due to its size, the scope of the mission, and the fact they were sent to fight a world war. As a point of clarification, the Australian forces were also referred to as the A.E.F. during World War I but this paper does not discuss their service. 16

At the beginning of World War I the United States was in an isolationist mood and this combined with the geography of the U.S. naturally dictated an expeditionary army. One could argue that the U.S. military will always be expeditionary unless we fight Mexico or Canada or must defend the union from forces within. Despite our predisposition to expeditionary operations, the U.S. military in 1918 was not prepared to enter the war and the Army specifically had the daunting task of growing from 190,000 troops to 3.5 million by the signing of the armistice. 17

United States politics can be confusing and deceiving to other countries and may not always signal our true intentions. Prior to America's entry into World War I, Germany had observed the efforts to increase the size of the U.S. Army, watched a President win reelection on the basis of keeping America out of the war, and had seen the reluctance of Congress to fund military improvements. Combine this with the American aversion to a large standing Army and the observed antagonism between the only organized forces at the time, the Regular Army and the National Guard, Germany could deduce that the United States might not come to Europe's aid. Perceptions such as these may send the wrong message to an adversary, actually causing an escalation of a crisis because the adversary views weakness or low resolve on our part.

Similar situations exists today in that the American people still have an aversion to a large standing Army, the Guard and Regular Army still battle with each other, and politics have led to decreased defense spending since 1986. Today's adversaries may perceive this as a reluctance of U.S. resolve to defend its interests and may create a vulnerability of the U.S. in the eyes of potential adversaries. Joint expeditionary forces which are in a constant state of readiness are important in ensuring others do not perceive the United States as weak.

The Army

While the Army of 1918 was called expeditionary it was far from prepared to perform the mission when called upon to deploy. According to William Wilgus, a post war historian,

"The fact that may be said to stand out above all others is that the United States, when war was declared, was in large part unprepared for the task in transportation that awaited it on the other side. This was true, not only as regards the material needs of warfare and the training of men, in which our unpreparedness was so general; but in a less excusable way it was true of things that called merely for thinking, without an attendant heavy expense."²⁰

Fortunately, United States military readiness has improved greatly since 1918 and the joint expeditionary force will be one more evolution toward constant preparedness.

The Army's expeditionary force is the XVIII Airborne Corps which is designed as an air transportable, rapidly deployable, quick reaction force. The mission of the XVIII Airborne Corps is to: "Provide a strategic crisis response force, manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea, and land anywhere in the world, prepared to fight upon arrival and win." Additional, Army units are prepared to fall-in on prepositioned heavy equipment in various land preposition sites or via stocks supplied by the Army Preposition Ships.

The Army is also experimenting with a more expeditionary force called Strike Force which will be adaptable and rapidly deployable and achieve full operational capability in 2003. The Army sees this force as being able "to deploy, almost

immediately, a lethal modular force" to fill a "void in capabilities available to the Commanders in Chief of the Unified Combatant Commands and the National Command Authority." Each Strike Force will be made up of 3,000 to 5,000 troops and combine both heavy and light elements. These Strike Forces could fulfill the NATO peacekeeping mission in places like Kosovo rather than sending the Marines to perform an Army mission. 25

The Marine Corps

The U.S. Marine Corps feels it is in the interest of the U.S. to have expeditionary forces organized, trained, equipped, and deployable to deal with overseas crises and as such have organized themselves as an expeditionary service. Stated another way: "An effective military response to an overseas crisis involving U.S. interests often requires the expeditionary capability to intervene or interpose in foreign political controversies." By way of clarification, a military intervention is the deliberate introduction of military forces into an existing controversy with the intent of influencing the events. A military interposition is the deliberate introduction of military forces during a crisis to protect a country's citizens from harm. States or training the controversy with the intent of country's citizens from harm.

The United States Marine Corps major fighting units are the Marine Expeditionary Force and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The Marines believe in expeditionary operations because they provide operational mobility, operational and tactical

competence, sustainability, adaptability, reconstitution, and cost-effectiveness.²⁹

"The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) is the principal Marine Corps warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies." There are three MEFs, I MEF, II MEF, III MEF each containing a permanent command element, one Marine division, a Marine aircraft wing, and a force service support group. The MEF is capable of conducting operations across the entire conflict spectrum and the size of the MEF is tailored to support mission requirements.

Due to their expeditionary nature, the Marines have traditionally been the "911 force" for the United States. They provide a forced entry capability. The maritime prepositioning ships squadrons provide thirty days of sustainment for 18,000 Marines. A MEF-FWD or a MEU are rapidly deployable through a combination of air and sea transport but deploying a full MEF is comparable to deploying an army corps. While they provide a good expeditionary force they are heavily tasked and U.S. military capabilities would be enhanced by complimenting them with other expeditionary forces when the situation and mission dictate.

The Navv

The Navy has always been expeditionary because of their inherent transportation ability. According to George Washington naval superiority is a fundamental principle. "Under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered a

fundamental principle, and the basis upon which all hope of success must ultimately depend."34

The qualities of modern naval forces, specifically, readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility permit naval forces to be expeditionary by "being able to establish and maintain a forward-based, stabilizing presence around the world." "Naval expeditionary operations are offensive in nature, mounted by highly trained and well-equipped integrated task forces of the Navy and Marine Corps, organized to accomplish specific objectives." In the Navy's view "power projection takes the battle to the enemy." "37

"Naval expeditionary forces combine the complimentary but distinct capabilities of the Navy and Marine Corps."³⁸ "Navy forces contribute the seaward element of naval expeditionary power projection" while "Marine forces contribute landing forces, the service landward extension of naval expeditionary power."³⁹ Marine and navy aviation can operate from land or sea. Naval expeditionary forces are unencumbered by treaty and access agreements and can maintain a presence for an extended period without reliance on host nations.⁴⁰ Naval expeditionary forces provide the NCA with power projection through carrier based strike aircraft, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), sea launched cruise missiles, special warfare forces, naval surface fire support, command and control warfare, and maritime prepositioning.⁴¹

Naval forces are primarily expeditionary since they have their own lift and can fight air, sea, land, and subsurface. This may not be enough firepower or range in future conflicts. Due to the decreased size of the Navy's fleet and the large number of areas they are called upon to operate in, the needs of the unified CINC can best be met by combining naval capabilities with those of the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force

The Air Force is currently evolving into an expeditionary force. During the Cold War, the Air Force maintained a large number of bases all over the world which were within flying distance of almost any contingency. These bases were primarily staffed by forces assigned for one to three years for an ongoing mission and did not truly fit the definition of expeditionary.

The end of the Cold War combined with a shrinking defense budget forced the closure of most of these bases. The U.S. Air Force overseas bases dropped from fifty during the Cold War to sixteen bases today. The base closures combined with the extended "temporary" operations in Northern and Southern Iraq and those in Bosnia-Herzegovina forced the Air Force to become expeditionary. Some of the drive towards expeditionary operations is based on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and part is based on being better able to provide the NCA and unified CINC with a more consistently robust aerospace package.

When air and space forces are necessary to fulfill the mission of a joint force commander, a Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force (ASETF) or Numbered Air Force (NAF) will be assigned as the command element. Under this command element, various air expeditionary wings (AEF) and air expeditionary groups (AEG) will form. 43

The AEF concept is scheduled for operational capability on 1 January 2000 and will consist of ten AEFs which rotate between on-call or deployed duty and a preparation phase. Each AEF is on-call for ninety days and two AEFs are always on duty to meet the ongoing taskings of the unified CINCs. Additionally another Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) is always on-call to respond to a pop-up crisis. The AEF concept provides a foundation for the JEF. An AEF or AEW would provide the Air Force portion of the JEF.

JOINT TASK FORCES AND RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES

Under current joint doctrine, most contingencies are handled under the control of a JTF such as operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, Panama, and Africa. JTFs are designed to accomplish missions with specific limited objectives, which do not require overall centralized control of logistics. They are designed to accomplish a specific ongoing mission and then dissolve when the mission no longer exists. The concept works well but each time a JTF stands-up an entire set of organizations must learn to

operate together and this involves a certain amount of spin-up time.

While the JTF is fairly effective, many of the component units have never worked together until the JTF is formed, leaving a vulnerability period while the various staffs develop professional relationships with their fellow JTF members. Much has been done in the past few years to provide JTF staff training for those individuals who would comprise a JTF staff.

Unfortunately most of these individuals never work together until a JTF stands up. Training, interoperability, and force familiarity will be key to the JEF concept development later in the paper.

An organization with some joint and expeditionary capabilities existed from 1961 through 1982. The organization began as STRIKE Command and evolved into Readiness Command (REDCOM), which included the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), and finally into a unified command, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). These forces were designed to respond to the "half" war of the 2½ war strategy of the 1960s. STRIKE and REDCOM consisted of Army and Air Force units while the RDJTF was comprised of units from all four services.

As with JTFs, "the forces available to STRIKE Command to accomplish these missions were not assigned to STRIKE on a day-to-day basis." STRIKE Command was too general a force which while it had a headquarters, it lost control of its troops when

deployed to a regional command's area of responsibility.⁴⁹

Consequently, STRIKE did not have any assigned forces, and the forces which would have filled STRIKE were mostly sent to Vietnam.⁵⁰ Each region having its own joint expeditionary forces under the command of the regional CINC will be vital in the JEF concept development.

The following quote about the RDJTF highlights some of the pitfalls to avoid when developing the JEF. Some felt the RDJTF was a

"fatally flawed military instrument for preservation of uninterrupted U.S. access to vital Persian Gulf oil - the principal rationale underlying the force. Indeed the RDF is not a force as such, but rather a hastily-thrown together collection of existing units based in the United States. Most of these units are already earmarked for contingencies outside the Gulf region and improperly equipped or structured for the exacting demands of desert warfare against large and often mechanized potential adversaries in a logically remote area of the world." 51

Of the pitfalls listed, the primary limitation was that although the RDJTF had forces from all four services it did not have any assigned forces on a day-to-day basis. 2 Another limitation was that the RDJTF had a divided command structure. USREDCOM was responsible for training but responsibility for execution was under the RDJTF commander, who would lead forces whose availability he didn't control and whose operational plans were created by someone else's staff. This is truly not the way a commander wants to fight. A CINC should tell the force provider what capability he needs and the force provider will

tailor the package to fit the requirement. This is why the JEF will be designed with its forces assigned to a unified CINC on a day-to-day basis, will train together under the CINC's command and control structure, and will employ under the CINC's command and control or as a JTF/JEF assigned by the CINC.

THE JOINT EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

Over the years each service has evolved into a more expeditionary force. The Marines have always been an expeditionary force and it is part of their legislative codification. They are the leaders in expeditionary developments. The Navy has been expeditionary for most of its existence as well due to its ability to operate anywhere on the globe. The Army has been expeditionary in the form of deploying to whichever crisis develops and has over the years attempted to become lighter in order to make the deployment phase easier. The Air Force has always possessed an inherent expeditionary character but the Cold War establishment drove it and the Army to a large forward presence across much of the civilized world and consequently a smaller reliance on expeditionary forces.

These characteristics combined with the end of the Cold War have led to an expeditionary evolution of each service. The Marines continue to hone their expeditionary skills as does the Navy. The Army continues to find ways to become lighter and more lethal thereby creating a deployable expeditionary force. The

Air Force is creating its own Expeditionary Air Force through the creation of the ten AEFs.

The unified commander currently relies on the services to train and equip these expeditionary forces and USACOM to be the joint integrator/joint force provider. These forces are formed into a JTF for employment but have not trained together and therefore there is a period of time where the force is not as effective as it could be. In the interest of better meeting the needs of America for the $21^{\rm st}$ century why not form these individual service units into a JEF from the beginning instead of after a crisis begins. Physically this would be a force evolution, however, from a service parochialism and human standpoint this would be seen as a revolution in the U.S. military. This may be one way to make the most of shrinking defense budgets. The U.S. must maintain the ability to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict and project power anywhere on the globe as a means of supporting our national leaders in responding to any crisis or conflict.54

The JEF is a force created from the service components assigned to each regional unified command. The size of each JEF will vary depending on the unified command and the CINC's preference. The CINC may choose to build the JEF using all of the forces assigned to him or more likely, a smaller, tailored, more mobile joint force consisting of a portion of the CINC's service components. A CINC may decide to build his JEF with

forces from only two of the components. The generic JEF would consist of an Air Force AEW, an Army division/regiment, a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with an amphibious ready group (ARG), and a carrier battle group (CVBG) or surface action group (SAG) depending on the region. The key portion of a JEF's effectiveness will be in its ability to train together on a day-to-day basis. This will develop the required staff interpersonal relationships for the units to be immediately effective during the initial phases of a crisis response.

Only the portion of each JEF required to perform the mission would deploy. In other words, the CINC would have the ability to task and tailor the JEF prior to deployment or employment. In the ideal world each JEF would be based on the same base as the unified command headquarters. In reality, given fiscal constraints and the political nature of moving units and possibly closing bases, today's advanced communications networks will link all the components of a JEF.

The JEF will plan and train together thereby learning each other's service unique capabilities and through this process be best able to provide a synergistic force to the CINC.

As George Washington said on 15 September 1770, "Our object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one." By designing and creating JEFs, the size of the armed services will not increase but the regional unified commands will be better able to provide an immediate reaction force, task tailored to

fulfill the mission of their region. The draw down from the Cold War combined with the Goldwater/Nichols Act of 1986 forced the individual services to rely more and more on each other. The day is past when one service has the hardware and force structure to respond to a crisis alone. All four services and in some cases the Coast Guard must prepare by training together and preparing to employ as one joint force.

This problem is not new as stated by Lieutenant General P.X. Kelley, RDJTF Commander during Senate Armed Services Committee testimony.

"Rapid deployment forces are not new. We have had them for several decades. They consist of existing forces of all services which have been designated to be ready to deploy on short notice. However, the nature of the threats of the 1980s, especially in the Persian Gulf area, demands that we be able to do it better and do it faster." 56

The JEF is one solution to the challenges posed by Lieutenant General Kelley. JEFs will combine existing forces into a joint team capable of rapidly providing the initial response force across most of the conflict spectrum, specifically from humanitarian operations to just short of major theater war (MTW). Since the JEF belongs to the CINC he can adjust it as necessary as new threats emerge. By the very nature of these forces training and employing together on a routine basis and operating under the same command and control structure a certain degree of flexibility is realized. In the case of Operations Desert Storm

/ Desert Shield, flexibility made up for shortfalls in planning, force structure, capabilities, and limitations. 57

The JEF would truly be the embodiment of jointness as defined by USACOM:

Jointness is the art of combining capabilities from the different Military Services to create an effect that is greater than the sum of the parts. Not all military functions or capabilities need to be joint . . . Interoperability is the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. ⁵⁸

The specific unified commands that would have the initial JEFs are USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM.

USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM, and USSPACECOM are already adequately organized as joint forces capable of quick reaction to crisis. A follow-on JEF would be created in USACOM to assist any CINC whose primary JEF is fully engaged in a crisis. USSOCOM currently operates as a large JEF and can be considered an example for the others to follow.

In Marine operations the idea of expeditionary is a mindset. It epitomizes the phrase "bags packed" and the idea of being prepared to deploy on a moments notice. This mindset is crucial to the development of JEFs.

Strategic mobility will be vital to the JEF. As such strategic airlift and sealift assets will not be part of a JEF but will remain under USTRANSCOM. Strategic airlift will exercise routinely with each JEF to provide increased familiarity

for both forces. Each JEF will be assigned tactical airlift. Additionally, lift may come from ships or land conveyance depending on the region. The JEF can make use of the sealift from the ARG and from the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) around the globe. Other sealift will come from the ships of Military Sealift Command (MSC). Again the lift is not assigned to the JEF but will exercise together routinely. This exercise arrangement will be a key part of the JEF's ability to have a rapid closure rate.

Joint Pub 4-05 describes the graduated repose process as having three stages: planning and preparation, crisis management, and national emergency or war. The JEF concept supports all three of these phases. By having the JEF, a certain amount of training and planning occurs daily which better prepares them for the planning and preparation phase. In other words the JEF is in the planning and preparation phase on a daily basis. The JEF is organized to respond rapidly to global crises and therefore naturally supports crisis management. While a JEF is not robust enough to handle a national emergency or war by itself it would be the initial response force for a CINC to send while mobilizing and deploying a large force to fight the war.

Specific events on the range of military operations include global war, multiple regional contingencies, regional contingencies, peace operations, humanitarian assistance / counter drug operations, and civil disturbance / natural

disaster. A JEF would be trained and prepared to meet any mission along this line. The JEF will not be capable of prosecuting global war but rather will be the initial response force to stabilize the crisis while heavier forces mobilize and deploy.

Under joint doctrine, "the JFC structures the joint force to ensure the diverse component capabilities, operations, and forces complement each other to achieve the desired results effectively and efficiently." The JEF concept truly allows the unified CINC to do this in advance of a crisis rather than building a joint fighting force from units which may have never seen each other after the crisis occurs. Joint Pub 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, stresses the importance of "joint interdiction operations being most effective when planned and executed in a synergistic manner with planned and ongoing air, land, sea, space, information, and special operations forces." The JEF does this daily during training and therefore actual employment is merely a continuation of established tactics techniques and procedures practiced every day.

The inherent capabilities of the JEF allow the CINC to conduct symmetric or asymmetric operations as the situation dictates. The magnitude of force he has is limited but the capabilities and synergy for immediate response options are enhanced.

The absence of unity of effort contributed to a confusing and wasteful World War I mobilization. This was based largely on the nation's reluctance to become involved in a European War and a resistance to planning. The JEF will prevent this way of thinking by being uniquely prepared to defend U.S interests anytime, anywhere.

One major potential drawback to this plan is the perception that the JEF may signal the end of the individual services and create one joint service. This is not the idea of the JEF. Each service maintains its individual identity, uniform, and traditions. It is vital to keep service pride and tradition as a means of motivation for the individual soldier, sailor, marine, airman, or coastguardsman.⁶⁵

One potential critic of the JEF concept may be Robert Haffa who was critical of the "half" war strategy behind STRIKE and REDCOM in the 1970s and 1980s. He felt that "what was missing from the development of the strategic concept of the "half war," we also will find absent in the organizational development of the "half war" commands that followed: the failure to plan forces to meet a range of multiple or sequential scenarios that were likely to occur. Growing from this conceptual failure was a tendency to believe that a single all-purpose force could meet any lesser contingency most effectively and economically." The JEF will be specifically designed to avoid this failure. Each regional CINC

will have his own JEF. That JEF will be tailored to meet potential missions in a specific area of responsibility.

Some may be concerned the JEF will take the place of the Marine Corps as America's "911 force." The Marines will be an integral part of the JEF for each CINC. In some situations they may respond by themselves to a crisis. In others they will respond in conjunction with other components of the JEF. The JEF essentially takes the advantages of the Marine Corps expeditionary nature and in conjunction with components from other services makes a better expeditionary force.

The JEF does not support the long term missions of a CINC such as Operations Northern and Southern Watch. The JEF is an expeditionary force and is designed for the initial response and for meeting the limited objectives of late twentieth century conflict. A CINC's JEF will not be used for long term ongoing operations such as Northern and Southern Watch as they are not the best units for this task since the JEF trains to be expeditionary, and is not designed for semi-permanent operations. Forces for Northern/Southern Watch type operations will come from the forces of each component that are not tied to a JEF.

CONCLUSION

The concept of a building a joint expeditionary force for each CINC by the year 2010 is merely an evolution from the current operations involving air, naval, or marine expeditionary forces. The JEF is a task tailored immediate response force

under the COCOM of each regional CINC. Its creation will necessitate the assignment of forces to all of the regional CINCs on a daily basis. The JEF will capitalize on its day-to-day training as one joint force to be an effective initial response on day one of a crisis response. The CINC has the ability to tailor the size of his JEF. The JEF overcomes the shortfalls of today's JTFs by having interoperable forces ready to deploy that have worked together daily and are very familiar with each others capabilities/limitations.

The JEF concept does create the potential for the creation of one "purple" joint force wherein the services cease to exist as separate entities. The JEF concept will do all possible to prevent this from occurring as the individual service traditions and identities are vital to the high morale of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Each service will still provide for the "care and feeding" (administrative support) of the JEF forces. By 2010 all of the individual service chiefs and most of the generals and admirals will have matured under the joint system. They will be able to see the JEF for its benefits to the nation verses service parochialism.

The JEF will allow the regional CINC to shape, prepare, and respond within his AOR on a more direct basis than he is currently able. The JEF does offer benefits toward security for America in the twenty-first century.

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